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This paper investigates whether individual investors adjust their stock trading according 
to their stock selection abilities, which can be inferred from their trading history.  Fixed-
effect panel regressions provide strong evidence that the ability to forecast future stock 
returns significantly affects investors’ trading activity: investors purchase more actively if 
they are more likely to have stock selection ability.  Furthermore, trading experience – 
measured by the number of purchases, the number of different stocks purchased, and the 
variance of purchase dollar amounts – significantly helps improve investors’ portfolio 
performance.  In addition, we find that learning behavior varies across investors, which 
corroborates the heterogeneity of individual investors. 
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Do Individual Investors Learn from Their Trading Experience?  
 
Rationality of economic agents is a classic assumption in modern economics and finance.  This 
assumption simplifies the decision-making processes associated with constrained optimization 
problems, so that economic phenomena can be analyzed with mathematical models.  An 
important justification for this assumption is that agents are not likely to make systematic 
mistakes.  For instance, the assumption of rational expectations “does not deny that people often 
make forecasting errors, but it does suggest that errors will not persistently occur on one side or 
the other” (Sargent, 1993).  The argument is certainly appealing, but not necessarily 
substantiated.  This paper empirically tests whether a special group of agents - individual 
investors - learn about their stock selection ability from their own trading experience and adjust 
their trading behavior accordingly.  This study provides direct evidence regarding the 
fundamental argument of agent rationality: rational investors learn from their mistakes and thus 
mistakes should not be repeated systematically. 
 
The study of individual learning behavior has important economic implications.  First, the 
growing literature of behavioral economics and finance provides strong evidence that agents are 
not always fully rational at the aggregate level (see, e.g., Shleifer, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 
2002, for useful surveys).  However, there is much less evidence on whether individual 
economic agents learn to reduce their mistakes over time.  Our study helps fill this gap.  Second, 
our study provides empirical evidence regarding the appropriateness of assumed rationality.   
Specifically, if individuals do not learn, the rationality assumption, as well as the numerous 
ensuing economic theories, would be challenged.  Furthermore, our study is important because it 
helps facilitate future research concerning the behavior of economic agents by disentangling two 
possible sources of limited rationality at the aggregate level.  One possibility is that individuals 
are not fully rational and do not learn.  Another possibility is that while individuals do learn to 
become more rational over time, the representative agent remains limitedly rational because 




                                                 
1 See Bakshi and Chen (1994) and Ang and Maddaloni (2003) for examples about relations between economy and 
demography.   3
We test two hypotheses regarding individual investors’ learning behavior.  The first hypothesis 
concerns whether trading history affects future trading activity.  We assume individual investors 
are able to infer their stock selection ability from their trading history.  If investors are rational, 
their inferred stock selection ability should affect their future trading patterns.  Specifically, 
when they think they are able (unable) to select winning stocks, they should trade more (less) 
actively.  The second hypothesis concerns whether trading experience helps improve future 
portfolio performance.  Traders with more experience have more data (i.e., past trading activity) 
to infer their ability.  Therefore, their inferences should be more accurate, which should lead to 
better trading decisions and hence better portfolio performance. 
 
We use the nonparametric statistical model developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981), 
modified by Cumby and Modest (1987), and applied by Hartzmark (1991) and others to infer 
two types of stock selection ability: the ability to forecast the signs of future excess stock returns 
as well as the ability to forecast both the signs and magnitudes of future excess stock returns.   
We construct a time-series of inferred ability for each investor, and then use a fixed-effect panel 
data approach to investigate the effect of the inferred ability on investor trading, controlling for 
other possible trading-driving variables. 
 
Our empirical results provide evidence that both types of abilities to forecast over the coming 
month (20 trading days) significantly affect investors’ equity purchase decisions, while the 
ability to make short term (5 trading days) forecasts do not affect purchases.  We also find that 
trading experience helps improve portfolio performance.  Particularly, the more experienced an 
individual investor is (in terms of the number of purchases, the number of stocks purchased, and 
the variance of purchase dollar amounts), the higher is the future risk-adjusted return of her 
portfolio.  On the other hand, our results also demonstrate behavior variations across different 
categories of investors.  For example, active traders adjust their trading according to their 
inferred ability more dramatically than inactive traders.  Overall, our empirical findings suggest 
that (i) individual investors rationally learn from their own experience and adjust their stock 
purchases accordingly, and (ii) learning behavior is heterogeneous across individual investors. 
   4
We study individual investors because they are normally considered to be the most uninformed 
and unskilled economic agents.  They seem to be the real-world counterparts to the noise traders 
described by behavioral models (see, for example, De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, among others).  Individual investors have been modeled or documented to behave in many 
naïve ways.  For example, they may under-react or over-react to news; they may insufficiently or 
naïvely diversify their portfolios; they may hold too many local or domestic equities; they may 
make investment decisions based on familiarity instead of utility maximization; and confusion 
concerning stock tickers may even lead them to respond to news incorrectly.
2   In short, 
individual investors seem to be making a variety of mistakes that have significant economic 
consequences.  Therefore, they are suitable subjects for investigating potential learning behavior.  
If they are able to learn rationally, it seems plausible to argue that other more sophisticated 
economic agents should be able to learn as well. 
 
We study learning behavior pertaining to trading because, unlike other economic processes in 
which different types of behavior could all be rational, it is easier to identify trading mistakes.  
Since trading is costly, it is reasonable to argue that individual investors should not trade unless 
they have legitimate reasons.  Legitimate reasons include having (i) security analysis ability – 
the ability to select individual stocks that will outperform the market; (ii) market timing ability as 
defined by Merton (1981) – the ability to forecast stock market performance market relative to 
fixed-income securities; (iii) a need to rebalance their portfolios due to changes in personal 
preference or changes in the covariance matrix of asset returns; (iv) a desire to exploit tax 
benefits; or (v) a need to meet liquidity demands. 
 
Our analysis is based on a sizeable panel data set containing the trading activities of individuals 
belonging to a large national discount brokerage firm (see Odean 1998 and Barber and Odean 
2000 for more descriptions of the data).  This data set has several features that dramatically 
motivate our research.  First, the data allow us to observe individuals’ detailed trading history 
(including prices and shares of stock bought and sold on a given date), dramatically facilitating 
the inference of investor security analysis ability.  Second, the data allow us to follow individuals 
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over a period of six years, which is beneficial because the learning process is naturally a 
temporal process.  Finally, the data set contains a large number of individual investors, therefore 
we are able to attain more inference power by exploiting the variation across individuals and thus 
mitigate possible sample selection problems. 
 
It is worth noting that rational learning behavior (i.e., whereby investors adjust their trading 
according to their inferred ability) relates to but also differs from irrational performance-
feedback trading (i.e., whereby investors become overconfident after good performance and 
consequently trade more actively).  First, rational learning captures the relation between ability 
and trading activity, while performance-feedback trading captures the relation between 
performance and trading activity.  Good performance does not necessarily suggest skill or ability 
since performance can be due entirely to luck.  Ability is estimated using methodology 
established in Henriksson and Merton (1981) and modified by Cumby and Modest (1987), which 
is based on significant statistical relations that are unlikely to be outcomes of chance.  Second, 
performance-feedback trading may suggest asymmetric reinforcement.  Good performance may 
lead to overconfidence and thus more trading, but poor performance does not necessarily lead to 
less trading.  On the other hand, rational learning suggests that investors should adjust their 
trading activity according to their ability, regardless of their past performance (i.e., good or bad).  
Finally, rational learning behavior suggests that trading experience should help improve future 
investor performance, while performance-feedback trading lacks this implication. 
 
This paper relates to literature regarding individual investor trading, which has documented 
several important, and often not fully rational, behaviors.
3   For example, investors trade 
excessively: investors who trade the most earn the lowest average returns after transaction costs.  
Interestingly, on average, men trade more actively yet perform worse than women.  Investors 
who switch from phone-based trading to online trading also trade more and earn lower returns.  
Additionally, individual investors are often reluctant to realize their losses.  Finally, the trading 
activity of individual investors is affected by past returns and historical price patterns.  Our 
empirical results provide evidence that, despite these irrational behaviors, individual investors 
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rationally learn from their trading experience and adjust their trading according to their stock 
selection ability, thus indicating the complexity of human behavior. 
 
This paper also relates to recent finding concerning individual investors’ ability to beat the 
market.  Coval et al. (2003) show that a portion of individual investors persistently earn average 
excess returns, suggesting that at least some individual investors are able to select stocks.  Our 
empirical results suggest that individual investors can become better traders over time: if they 
have (do not have) stock selection ability, they will trade more (less) actively, and trading 
experience helps them achieve better portfolio performance.  
 
Our empirical evidence corroborates recent findings pertaining to individual learning behavior in 
marketplaces. Using experiments, List (2003) finds that market experience plays a significant 
role in eliminating the endowment effect - individual behavior converges to neoclassical 
predictions as market experience increases.  Dhar and Zhu (2003) find that trading experience 
helps alleviate individual investors’ tendency to sell winning stocks too soon and hold losing 
stocks too long.  We find that individual investors, despite their various investment mistakes, are 
able to achieve better portfolio performance by adjusting their stock purchases according to their 
trading experience. This finding emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity among economic 
agents in the economy. The composition of investors, e.g. experienced vs. inexperienced, could 
potentially influence how the market functions. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I describes the data.  Section II discusses our research 
design.  Section III reports our estimation results.  Section IV concludes. 
I. Data 
The data used in this study come from a large discount brokerage firm, and cover the 
investments of 78,000 households from January 1991 to December 1996.
4  The data have three 
important components: (1) Position data record the sample households’ end-of-month portfolio 
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positions. (2) Trade data record all trades made by sample investors. Both the trading and 
position files include common stocks, mutual funds, and other securities (i.e., American Deposit 
Receipt, fixed income securities, and options). (3) An investor characteristics file includes 
investor characteristics such as investors’ income levels, occupation categories, ages, and when 
they opened their accounts. 
 
In this study, we focus on investors’ stock selection ability so we exclude 11,535 investors who 
do not hold common stocks in any month of our sample period.  Sample households can open 
multiple accounts at the discount brokerage firm.  An average sample household has two 
accounts. The most common reason for two accounts is the tax-preferred status of retirement 
accounts. Common stocks make up roughly 60 percent of the account values and slightly more 
than 60 percent of all trades. 
 
The dataset is filtered as follows:  First, if a household has multiple trading accounts, we treat 
these accounts as one large account, aggregating monthly trades across all accounts associated 
with a particular household.  Then, only households that opened their first account in 1990 or 
1991 are examined because their entire timeline of trading activity beginning with their very first 
trade can be observed.  Finally, to be in the sample at time t , household i  must have non-
missing data for all variables utilized in this analysis.  These requirements result in a sample of 
65,118 household-months for 2,973 households, spanning the calendar time March, 1991 to 
November, 1996. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the trading activities and shows that individual investors have very different 
trading behavior.  For example, the average number of trades per month varies dramatically from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 113.0; the average number of buys per month varies from 0 to 
49.67; and the average number of sells varies from 0 to 63.33. 
II. Research Design 
We test two null hypotheses regarding investors’ learning behavior: (i) investors’ stock 
purchases are not affected by their security analysis ability, which they estimate using past 
purchases and post-purchase stock returns; (ii) trading experience does not help investors   8
improve the performance of their portfolios.  To test the first hypothesis, we construct monthly 
series of security analysis ability proxies for each investor, then run fixed effect regressions of 
the number of stock purchases on the ability proxies, controlling for other variables that may 
affect stock purchases.  Two types of security analysis abilities are studied: the ability to forecast 
the signs of future risk-adjusted excess stock returns and the ability to forecast both the signs and 
the magnitudes of future risk-adjusted excess stock returns, where the future is defined as the 5 
and 20 trading days following the purchase, respectively.  To test the second hypothesis, we 
construct time series of 3 different measures of trading experience for each household, and run 
fixed effect regressions of investors’ portfolio risk-adjusted excess return on the trading 
experience measures. 
 
We follow Coval et al. (2003) and use trades that initiate or expand existing positions in 
companies in order to infer investors’ abilities.  Essentially, we consider buys as predictions of 
future price increases, but do not consider sales as predictions of future price decreases.  The 
rationale is, as Coval et al. (2003) argue, that sales are often not strongly driven by private 
information or specific analysis of the sold stock.  Instead, investors may sell to satisfy liquidity 
needs or to move into other firms expected to outperform the market, etc.  We also ignore short-
sales since there are very few occurrences. 
Does Ability Affect Future Purchases? 
The evaluation of investors’ forecasting ability is a well-studied problem in finance (see Becker 
et al., 1999, Henriksson and Merton, 1981, Cumby and Modest, 1987, Hartzmark, 1987 and 1991, 
Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 1986, and Merton, 1981, among many others).  It is conventional 
(e.g., Merton, 1981) to partition forecasting skills into “microforecasting” and 
“macroforecasting,” defined as forecasting individual stocks’ price movements relative to the 
market and stock market price movements relative to fixed-income securities, respectively.  The 
former is frequently referred to “security analysis” and the latter is termed “market timing.”  This 
paper focuses on investors’ security analysis abilities. 
 
The first type of security analysis ability we study is the ability to forecast the signs of future 
risk-adjusted excess stock returns.  A classic approach to evaluate this type of ability is   9
developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) and later modified by Cumby and Modest (1987) 
and concerns whether the conditional probability of correctly forecasting the signs of future price 
changes significantly differs from 0.5.  This approach and its extensions are widely used to study 
the performance of mutual funds and futures market traders, as well as the forecasting ability of 
newsletters.
5  Since we study only purchases, inferring security analysis ability is dramatically 
simplified under the assumption that investors are equally capable of forecasting future price 
increases and decreases. 
 
The inference of investors’ abilities to forecast the signs of future risk-adjusted excess returns 
consists of the following steps.  First, we estimate the risk-adjusted excess return of purchased 
stocks in the week (5 trading days) and month (20 trading days) after the purchases, respectively.  
The different horizons are chosen to investigate investors’ ability to forecast short-term and 
longer-term excess returns. To do this, for each purchased stock, we first run a time series 
regression of its daily returns net the Treasury-bill rates on the Fama-French factors using a time 
window spanning 100 trading days before to 100 days after the purchase day.  The stock’s excess 
return over the week or month following the purchase is the sum of its estimated regression 
intercept and the error terms during the period in question; or equivalently, the realized return 
minus the sum of the estimated factor loadings times the realized value of each of the factors.  
We start with the day following the purchase to mitigate possible price impacts. 
 
For investor i at the beginning of month t, the information with which the investor can infer her 
ability includes  , it N  and  , it G .    , it N  is the number of purchases made at least 5 or 20 trading days 
before t (depending on the forecasting time horizon).   , it G  is the number of good purchases, 
which are purchases with nonnegative risk-adjusted excess returns over the 5 or 20 subsequent 
trading days (depending on the forecasting time horizon).  Assuming the sign of the excess return 
is generated from a binomial process, the null hypothesis is that the probability that the risk-
adjusted excess return conditional upon purchase will be positive is 0.5.  A two-sided test of the 
hypothesis is straightforward, and we follow Hartzmark (1991) and define a proxy for the 
security selection ability as 
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This proxy incorporates information on the direction and significance of the ability.  For example, 
if  ,, it it GN   equals 0.8 and the probability significance level is 0.15, then 
() , 1 0.15 1 0.85 it FS =− × = .  Therefore, the range ( ) , 11 it FS − ≤≤  encompasses the universe of 
investors: those with statistically significant inferior ability, those with no ability, and those with 
statistically significant superior ability.  To differentiate the ability estimated using the risk-
adjusted excess return in the week after the purchase from that estimated using the excess return 
over the following month, we denote the former by 
5
, it FS  and the latter by 
20
, it FS . 
 
Hartzmark (1991) defines the big hit ability as the capability to predict both the magnitude and 
direction of future price changes.  Investors with superior big hit ability will establish larger long 
positions when higher excess returns are anticipated.  At time t, denote by  , ij R  the subsequent 
risk-adjusted excess return of the j
th stock purchased by investor i , and by  , ij D  the  dollar 
amount of the purchase (the number of shares multiplied by the transaction price).  At the 
beginning of month t, we run a times-series regression investor i, 
  ,, , , ij i t ij ij RD α βε = ++ , (2) 
using all purchases made 5 or 20 trading days before t, respectively.  To incorporate information 
on the sign of the estimator of β , standard errors, and degree of freedom into one aggregate 
measure, we follow Hartzmark (1991) and define the big hit ability for investor i at t,  , it FB , as 
  () ( ) ,, , 1 probability significance level sign of  it it it FB β =− × . (3) 
 
Apparently, the range of  , it FB  is still ( ) 1,1 − .  To differentiate  , it FB  estimated using the excess 
return in the week after the purchase from that estimated using the excess return in the following 
month, we denote the former by 
5
, it FB  and the latter by 
20
, it FB . 
 
We study the relation between investors’ purchases and security analysis abilities using the 
following fixed effect regression.   11
  ( )
t i t t t m t m
t m t m t i t i t m t i t i i t i
JAN DEC V GR
SD SD P R R T F c T
, 10 9 1 , 8 1 , 7
1 , , 6 1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 ,
3 ε ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ + + + +
− + + + + + + =
− −
− − − − −  (4) 
In equation (4),  , it T  is the number of purchases made by investor i in month t;  , it F  is investor 
i ’s security analysis ability and takes the value of 
5
, it FS , 
20
, it FS , 
5
, it FB  and 
20
, it FB , respectively; 
,1 mt R −  is the lagged S&P500 index return;  ,1 it R −  is the lagged personal portfolio return of the 
investor;  1 , − t i P is the market value of investor i’s portfolio (consisting of both mutual funds and 
stocks) at the end of month  1 t − ;  , mt SD  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of all stock 
returns in the market, and  ,, 1 mt mt SD SD − −  captures the change in the cross-stock return standard 
deviation;  1 , 3 − t m GR  is the compounded return of S&P500 over the past three years;  1 , − t m V  is the 
dollar value of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks traded in the prior month;  t DEC  is a dummy 
variable for December; and  t JAN  is a dummy variable for January. 
 
Equation (4) includes  , it F  as an explanatory variable to study whether security analysis ability 
affects trading.  If an investor is rational, when  , it F  is positive, she should capitalize on her 
ability by purchasing stocks more actively, and when  , it F  is negative, she should reduces her 
trading activity.  Therefore, a positive  1 ρ  is consistent with the existence of rational investor 
learning.   
 
Besides  , it F , we include other explanatory variables in equation (4) to control for other trading 
needs.  First, we include lagged purchases to control for possible serial correlation in trading 
activity.  Second, we use the change in cross-sectional standard deviation of all stocks returns in 
the market as a proxy for the change in the covariance of stock returns to control for rational 
portfolio rebalancing.  In addition, we include lagged market and personal portfolio returns.  The 
lagged personal portfolio return helps control for performance-feedback trading, and the lagged 
long-run historical market performance helps capture the possible evolution of trading behavior, 
such as that caused by changing investor sentiment correlated with market trends.  In addition, 
we include the lagged market value of investors’ portfolios to control for possible relations 
between trading and portfolio size.  For instance, some investors may cease trading simply   12
because they have consumed almost all of their wealth and thus have no money with which to 
trade.  We also include lagged market trading volume in dollar terms to control for fads and/or 
herding in the investment market.  Furthermore, we use December and January dummy variables 
to capture possible trading seasonality (see e.g., Kumar and Lee, 2002).  Finally, we include an 
individual time-invariant intercept to capture trading associated with time-invariant components 
of latent variables such as the investor’s risk attitude, gender, personal income, education, etc.  
Other trading needs are captured by the error term. 
Does Experience Help Improve Performance? 
If investors rationally learn from past trading, as an investor’s trading experiences increases (e.g., 
more purchase transactions and/or more stocks purchased) so does the information set with 
which the investor estimates her stock selection ability.  This larger sample size should improve 
the precision of the ability estimates, and subsequent trading decisions should improve 
performance more significantly.   
 
We first construct monthly time series of risk-adjusted portfolio returns,  , it RER , for each investor 
by adding the estimated intercept term to the estimation residuals of the regression of monthly 
investor portfolio returns net the Treasury-bill rates on the Fama-French factors.  These risk-
adjusted portfolio returns are measures of investors’ portfolio performance.  We use three 
measures of the trading experience, denoted by  , it E .  The first measure is simply the number of 






= ∑ .  The second measure is the number of different stocks an 
investor has ever purchased prior to time t.  The third measure is the variance of the dollar 
amounts of purchases prior to t .  It is not implausible to argue that the more purchases an 
investor has made and the more different stocks an investor has purchased, the better equipped 
she is to infer her security analysis ability.  Furthermore, the larger is the variance of the 
explanatory variable, which is the dollar amounts of purchases in regression (2), the more 
accurately the big hit ability can be estimated. 
 
We investigate the relation between trading experience and portfolio performance using the 
following fixed effect regression.   13
  ,, , it i it it RER c E ρ ε = ++  (5) 
In (5),  , it RER  is the estimated risk-adjusted excess return of investor i’s portfolio at time t;  , it E  
is investor i’s trading experience at time t, and can assume three measures respectively;  i c  is an 
individual time-invariant intercept that captures unobserved individual specific factors;  , it ε  is a 
zero mean error term.  A positive ρ  is consistent with the existence of rational investor learning.  
Sub-sample Analysis 
We conduct a variety of sub-sample studies.  First, we re-estimate equations (4) and (5) using 
data in odd and even transaction months.  Second, we re-estimate the equations for two 
categories of investors: active traders (complete at least 25 trades in the sample period) and 
inactive traders.  Finally, we re-estimate the equations after categorizing investors according to 
their average excess portfolio performance as winners (top one third), average (middle one third), 
and losers (bottom one third). 
 
The results of these sub-sample studies may have different interpretations.  Under the assumption 
of homogenous investors, these studies are robustness checks.  However, allowing for the 
heterogeneity of investors, these studies may reveal systematic differences between different 
types of individual investors. 
III. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results of regression (4) based on all investors in our sample.  First, we find 
that the coefficients of both 
20
, it FS  and 
20
, it FB  are significantly positive at the 1% level.  Therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis that investors’ stock purchases are not affected by their abilities to 
forecast the signs and magnitudes of excess stock returns over the time horizon of 20 business 
days.  Furthermore, the positive signs of the coefficients are consistent with the rational learning 
hypothesis: when investors believe they are able to forecast excess returns, they purchase more 
actively; when they do not believe in their ability, they reduce their stock purchases.  Note that 
the past performance of investors and the stock market have been controlled, so our results are 
not caused by performance-feedback trading.  At the same time, we find that 
5
, it FS  significantly   14
reduces stock purchases and 
5
, it FB  is insignificant, which suggests that investors do not adjust 
their purchases according to their ability to forecast excess returns over the time horizon of 5 
business days.  Consequently, we can not reject the null hypothesis that investors are not learning 
from their trading experience.  However, it is worth noting that the negative or insignificant 
coefficients do not necessarily support the null hypothesis.  There are a variety of possible 
reasons why rational learning investors may not adjust their stock purchases according to their 
ability to forecast short term excess returns.  For example, individual investors may simply 
intend to profit in a longer time horizon.   
 
Tables 3 to 9 report the results of regression (4) using different sub-samples.  Tables 3 and 4 
report the results based on observations in each investor’s odd and even transaction months.  
Tables 5 and 6 examine active and inactive investors.  Tables 7, 8, and 9 are for households 
whose arithmetic average monthly portfolio return in excess of the market return belonged in the 
top, middle, and bottom one third of the distribution.  These tables suggest that, on one hand, the 
learning behavior we find in table 2 is observed in most sub sample studies.  First, the coefficient 
of 
20
, it FS  is significantly positive except for winners and even transaction months, for which the 
coefficient is insignificant.  It is worth noting that an insignificant coefficient does not 
necessarily suggest that investors do not learn.  It is possible that the insignificant coefficient of 
winners is an artifact.  For example, the number of purchases made by winners may be relatively 
stable even if they actively learn and trade accordingly, because investors’ purchasing activity 
can be limited by their wealth levels.  Second, the coefficient of 
20
, it FB  is significantly positive 
except for inactive traders, average performance and losers, for which the coefficient is 
insignificant.  On the other hand, tables 3 to 9 also suggest the learning behavior differs across 
investors.  For instance, losers respond more dramatically to their ability to forecast the direction 
of future excess returns, while winners do not seem to respond.   However, the differences may 
not be surprising since the heterogeneity of economic agents is an expected and established fact. 
 
Table 10 reports the results of regression (5) using the full sample along with different sub-
samples.  All three proxies are significantly positive, which rejects the null hypothesis that 
trading experience does not help improve portfolio performance and is consistent with rational   15
investor learning behavior.  The sub-sample studies, on the other hand, suggest heterogeneity 
across investors.  For example, inactive traders benefit much more significantly from the number 
of prior purchases and the number of different purchased stocks than active traders.  In addition, 
investors with average performance benefit more from their trading experience than winners and 
losers. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether a special group of economic agents - individual investors - learn 
about their stock selection ability from their own trading experience and then accordingly adjust 
their stock trading activity.  We find that stock selection ability – particularly the ability to 
forecast the signs and both the signs and magnitudes of excess stock returns in coming month – 
significantly affects stock purchases.  However, the ability to make short term (5 trading days) 
forecasts does not affect purchasing activity.  We also find that trading experience helps improve 
portfolio performance.  Particularly, as an investor completes more purchase transactions and 
purchases more unique stocks, her portfolio’s subsequent risk-adjusted monthly return is higher.  
Overall, our empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that individual investors 
(despite making numerous documented mistakes) learn from their own trading experience, adjust 
their stock purchases accordingly, and achieve higher portfolio performance.  Our empirical 
results also highlight the importance of individual investor heterogeneity.  Specifically, learning 
behavior varies across different categories of investors.  For example, active traders adjust their 
stock purchases according to their abilities more dramatically than inactive traders.   16
References 
Alpert M., and H. Raiffa, 1982. A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors,” in 
D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ang, Andrew and Angela Maddaloni, 2003. Do Demographic Changes Affect Risk Premiums? 
Evidence from International Data. Journal of Business, forthcoming. 
 
Bakshi, Gurdip and Zhiwu Chen, 1994. Baby Boom, Population Aging, and Capital Markets. 
Journal of Business, 67 (2), 165-202.  
 
Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean, 2000. Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The 
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors. Journal of Finance, 55, 773-
806. 
 
Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean, 2001. Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and 
Common Stock Investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 141, 261-292. 
 
Barber, Brad M. and Terrance Odean, 2002a. Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First? Review of 
Financial Studies, 15, 455-487. 
 
Barber, Brad, and Terrance Odean, 2002b. All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on 
the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors. Working paper, UC Berkeley. 
 
Barberis, Nicholas and Thaler, Richard, 2002. A Survey of Behavioral Finance. Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, edited by George Constantinides, Milt Harris and Rene Stulz, 
forthcoming. 
 
Becker, Connie, David Myers, and Michael Schill, 1999. Conditional Market Timing with 
Benchmark Investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 119-148. 
 
Benartzi, Shlomo, 2001. Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to 
Compnay Stock. Journal of Finance 56, 1747-1764. 
 
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard Thaler, 2001. Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans. American Economic Review, 91:79-98. 
 
Bollen, N.P.B. and J.A. Busse, 2001. On the Timing Ability of Mutual Fund Managers. Journal 
of Finance, 56 (3): 1075-1094. 
 
Chance, D.M. and M.L. Hemler, 2001. The Performance of Professional Market Timers: Daily 
Evidence from Executed Strategies. Journal of Financial Economics, 62 (2): 377-411. 
 
Coval, Joshua, David Hirshleifer, and Tyler Shumway, 2003. Can Individual Investors Beat the 
Market? Harvard NOM working paper. 
   17
Coval, Joshua, and Toby Moskowitz, 1999. Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in 
Domestic Portfolios. Journal of Finance, 54, 2045-73 
 
Cumby, Robert E. and David M. Modest, 1987. Testing for Market Timing Ability: A 
Framework for Forecast Evaluation. Journal of Financial Economics, 19: 169-190. 
 
Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 1998. Investor Psychology and 
Security Market under- and overreactions. Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1886. 
 
Dhar, Ravi and Ning Zhu, 2002. Up Close and Personal: An Individual Level Analysis of the 
Disposition Effect. Yale ICF Working Paper. 
 
De Long, J.B., A. Shleifer, L. Summer, and R. Waldmann, 1990. Noise Trader Risk in Financial 
Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703-738. 
 
Erev, Ido and Alvin E. Roth, 1998. Predicting How People May Play Games: Reinforcement 
Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria. American Economic 
Review, 88(4), pp. 818-881. 
 
Fischoff B., P. Slovic, and S. Lichtenstein, 1977. Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness 
of Extreme Confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 3, 552-564. 
 
Goetzmann, William, and Alok Kumar, 2003. Diversification Decisions of Individual Investors 
and Asset Prices. Yale ICF Working Paper. 
 
Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R., 1996, Market Timing Ability and Volatility Implied in 
Investment Newsletters' Asset Allocation Recommendations. Journal of Financial Economics 42 
(3): 397-421. 
 
Grinblatt, Mark and Matti Keloharju, 2001. What Makes Investors Trade? Journal of Finance, 
56(2): 589-616. 
 
Hartzmark, Michael L., 1991. Luck Versus Forecast Ability – Determinants of Trader 
Performance in Futures Markets. Journal of Business, 64 (1): 49-74. 
 
Henriksson, Roy D. and Merton, Robert C., 1981. On Market Timing and Investment 
Performance. 2. Statistical Procedures for Evaluating Forecasting Skills. Journal of Business, 
54(4): 513-533. 
 
Hong, Harrison and Jeremy Stein, 1999. A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum 
Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets. Journal of Finance, 54, 2143-2184. 
 
Huberman, G., 2001. Familiarity Breeds Investment. Review of Financial Studies, 14, 659-680. 
   18
Ivkovich, Zoran, and Scott J. Weisbennner, 2003. Local Does as Local Is: Information Content 
of the Geography of Individual Investors’ Common Stock Investments.  University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign Working Paper. 
 
Jagannathan, R., and R. A. Korajczyk, 1986. Assessing the Market Timing Performance of 
Managed Portfolios. Journal of Business, 59 (2) 217-235. 
 
Kumar, Alok, and Charles M. C. Lee, 2002, Individual Investor Sentiment and Comovement in 
Small Stock Returns, University of Notre Dame Working Paper. 
 
List, John A. 2003. Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118 (1): 41-71. 
 
Merton, Robert C., 1981. On Market Timing and Investment Performance. I. An Equilibrium 
Theory of Value for Market Forecasts. Journal of Business, 54 (3): 363-406. 
 
Odean, Terrance, 1998. Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? Journal of Finance, 53: 
1775-1798. 
 
Odean, Terrance, 1999. Do Investors Trade Too Much? American Economic Review, 89: 1279-
1298 
 
Rashes, 2001. Massively Confused Investors Making Conspicuously Ignorant Choices (MCI-
MCIC). Journal of Finance, 56(5), 1911-1927. 
 
Sargent, Thomas J., Rational Expectations. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of 
Economics and Liberty. Retrieved August 24, 2003 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RationalExpectations.html  
 
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997. The Limits of Arbitrage. Journal of Finance, 52, 35-55. 
 
Shor, Mikhael, 2003. Learning to Respond: The Use of Heuristics in Dynamic Games. 
Vanderbilt University Working Paper. 
 
Womack, K.L., 1996. Do Brokerage Analysts’ Recommendations Have Investment Value? 
Journal of Finance, 51 (1): 137-167. 
 
Zhu, Ning, 2003. The Local Bias of Individual Investors. Yale ICF Working Paper.   19
Table 1 
Data Summary: Trading Activities 
This table reports summary statistics of the trading activities of households who opened their 
first accounts in 1990 and 1991, respectively. 
Average number of trades per month 
Accounts  Min  25% Median 75%  Max 
1990  0.00 0.17 0.38 0.80  43.16 
1991  0.00 0.15 0.34 0.79  113.00 
Total  0.00 0.16 0.37 0.79  113.00 
Average number of buys per month 
Accounts  Min  25% Median 75%  Max 
1990  0.00 0.09 0.21 0.45  21.06 
1991  0.00 0.07 0.19 0.45  49.67 
Total  0.00 0.08 0.20 0.45  49.67 
Average number of sells per month 
Accounts  Min  25% Median 75%  Max 
1990  0.00 0.07 0.17 0.37  22.09 
1991  0.00 0.05 0.14 0.36  63.33 
Total  0.00 0.06 0.15 0.36  63.33 
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Table 2 
Security Analysis Ability and Stock Purchases 
This table reports the results of the following fixed effect regression. 
( )
t i t t t m t m
t m t m t i t i t m t i t i i t i
JAN DEC V GR
SD SD P R R T F c T
, 10 9 1 , 8 1 , 7
1 , , 6 1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 , 1 ,
3 ε ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
+ + + + +
− + + + + + + =
− −
− − − − −  
, it T  is the number of purchases household i made in month t.   , it F  takes on the value of 
5
, it FS , 
20
, it FS , 
5
, it FB  and 
20
, it FB , respectively.  
5
, it FS  and 
20
, it FS  measure investors’ abilities to forecast the signs of future 
excess returns in the coming week (5 trading days) and month (20 trading days), respectively.  
5
, it FB  and 
20
, it FB  measure investors’ abilities to forecast both the signs and magnitudes of future excess returns in 
the coming week and month, respectively.  Additional explanatory variables are lagged purchases  ,1 it T − , 
lagged market return  ,1 mt R − , lagged portfolio return  ,1 it R − , households’ lagged mutual fund and stock 
positions  1 , − t i P  (coefficients are multiplied by 1,000,000), change of cross-sectional standard deviation of 
stock returns in the market  ,, 1 mt mt SD SD − − , lagged three-year S&P500 return  1 , 3 − t m GR , dollar value of 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks traded in the prior month  1 , − t m V , and December  t DEC  and  January 
t JAN  dummy variables.  Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are 
significant at the 1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   *-0.044 **0.073  0.009  **0.054 
2 ρ   **0.262 **0.262 **0.262 **0.262 
3 ρ   **0.811 **0.805 **0.811 **0.812 
4 ρ   **0.148 **0.147 **0.148 **0.147 
5 ρ   **-0.375 **-0.385 **-0.380 **-0.383 
6 ρ   **0.421 **0.424 **0.422 **0.421 
7 ρ   **0.511 **0.504 **0.509 **0.509 
8 ρ   **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 
9 ρ   -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
10 ρ   *0.045 *0.045 *0.045 *0.045 
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Table 3 
Security Analysis Ability and Stock Purchases: Odd Months 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses data for each household’s odd moths (transaction 
time).  Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are significant 
at the 1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   -0.016 **0.108 -0.029  *0.057 
2 ρ   **0.291 **0.290 **0.291 **0.290 
3 ρ   **0.955 **0.941 **0.955 **0.955 
4 ρ   *0.127 *0.127 *0.127 *0.126 
5 ρ   -0.077 -0.085 -0.077 -0.084 
6 ρ   **0.467 **0.469 **0.465 **0.467 
7 ρ   **0.528 **0.521 **0.529 **0.527 
8 ρ   **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 
9 ρ   -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 
10 ρ   0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
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Table 4 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases: Even Months 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses data for each household’s even months (transaction 
time). Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are significant 
at the 1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   *-0.071 0.041  0.045 *0.051 
2 ρ   **0.231 **0.231 **0.231 **0.231 
3 ρ   *0.664 *0.660 *0.661 *0.663 
4 ρ   **0.167 **0.167 **0.167 **0.167 
5 ρ   **-0.681 **-0.693 **-0.688 **-0.692 
6 ρ   *0.379 *0.385 *0.382 *0.383 
7 ρ   **0.496 **0.491 **0.492 **0.494 
8 ρ   **-0.000  *-0.000 *-0.000 *-0.000 
9 ρ   -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 
10 ρ   0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 
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Table 5 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases: Active Traders 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses households that performed at least 25 transactions 
throughout the entire sample period. Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and 
coefficients with ** are significant at the 1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   *-0.084 **0.084  0.018  **0.075 
2 ρ   **0.280 **0.280 **0.280 **0.280 
3 ρ   **1.408 **1.391 **1.406 **1.409 
4 ρ   **0.207 **0.206 **0.207 **0.206 
5 ρ   *-0.414 *-0.429 *-0.422 *-0.426 
6 ρ   **0.650 **0.652 **0.651 **0.650 
7 ρ   **0.721 **0.716 **0.723 **0.721 
8 ρ   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
9 ρ   -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
10 ρ   0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071 
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Table 6 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases: Inactive Traders 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses households who performed less than 25 transactions 
throughout the entire sample period. Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and 
coefficients with ** are significant at the 1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   **0.051 **0.064  0.006  0.012 
2 ρ   0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
3 ρ   -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 
4 ρ   0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
5 ρ   **-0.331 **-0.334 **-0.327 **-0.328 
6 ρ   0.025 0.026 0.024 0.024 
7 ρ   **0.339 **0.340 **0.343 **0.343 
8 ρ   **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 
9 ρ   **-0.031 **-0.031 **-0.031 **-0.031 
10 ρ   0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
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Table 7 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases: Winners 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses households whose arithmetic average monthly 
portfolio return in excess of the market return belonged in the top one third of the sample. 
Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are significant at the 
1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   *-0.114 -0.009  0.026 **0.154 
2 ρ   **0.329 **0.329 **0.329 **0.328 
3 ρ   **1.292 **1.287 **1.285 **1.278 
4 ρ   **0.145 **0.145 **0.145 **0.144 
5 ρ   -0.287 -0.299 -0.294 -0.294 
6 ρ   *0.471 *0.473 *0.474 *0.471 
7 ρ   **0.461 **0.464 **0.464 **0.459 
8 ρ   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 ρ   -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
10 ρ   0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
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Table 8 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases – Performance Groups (Average) 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses households whose arithmetic average monthly 
portfolio return in excess of the market return belonged in the middle one third of the sample. 
Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are significant at the 
1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   **-0.116 **0.080  0.045  -0.031 
2 ρ   **0.177 **0.177 **0.177 **0.177 
3 ρ   0.514 0.507 0.516 0.515 
4 ρ   **0.286 **0.287 **0.287 **0.288 
5 ρ   0.046 0.006 0.026 0.032 
6 ρ   **0.404 **0.407 **0.406 **0.406 
7 ρ   **0.516 **0.509 **0.513 **0.515 
8 ρ   **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 
9 ρ   0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
10 ρ   0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 
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Table 9 
Security Analysis Ability and Purchases – Performance Groups (Losers) 
This table reproduces Table 2 but only uses households whose arithmetic average monthly 
portfolio return in excess of the market return belonged in the bottom one third of the sample. 
Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with ** are significant at the 
1% level. 
  5
, it FS  
20
, it FS  
5
, it FB  
20
, it FB  
1 ρ   **0.180 **0.184 *-0.077  0.032 
2 ρ   **0.247 **0.246 **0.248 **0.248 
3 ρ   0.485 0.477 0.477 0.481 
4 ρ   0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 
5 ρ   **-0.915 **-0.915 **-0.902 **-0.904 
6 ρ   *0.356 *0.365 *0.358 *0.355 
7 ρ   **0.577 **0.578 **0.601 **0.592 
8 ρ   **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 **-0.000 
9 ρ   *-0.060 *-0.060 *-0.061 *-0.060 
10 ρ   0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 
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Table 10 
Trading Experience and Portfolio Performance 
This table reports the results of fixed effect regressions that test whether investors’ experience 
helps increase the risk adjusted excess returns of their portfolios. 
,, , it i it it RER c E ρ ε = ++  
, it RER  is the Fama French three factor-adjusted excess portfolio return of household i at month t, 
and  , it E  is household i ’s trading experience prior to t , which is measured by three different 
proxies.  The first experience proxy is household i ’s number of purchase transactions.  The 
second proxy is the number of different stocks household i has ever purchased.  The third proxy 
is the variance of the dollar amounts of household i ’s purchases.  Coefficients have been 
multiplied by 1,000,000. Coefficients with * are significant at the 5% level, and coefficients with 
** are significant at the 1% level. 
  Proxy 1  Proxy 2  Proxy 3 
All samples 
Coefficient **131.255 **366.745  **0.000 
Odd Months 
Coefficient 100.198  *340.954  0.000 
Even Months 
Coefficient **163.004 **391.744  *0.000 
Active Traders 
Coefficient **116.248 **322.120  *0.000 
Inactive Traders 
Coefficient **2280.551 **2659.029  0.000 
Winners 
Coefficient 115.402  316.317  0.000 
Average 
Coefficient **213.002 **396.693  0.000 
Losers 
Coefficient 89.677  433.041  0.000 
 